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Here, Owens postulates a permissive interest: an interest in being able to "determine by declaration whether something constitutes a wronging" (172).
So, Owens claims we can account for cases of harmless wronging if:
This is a consequence of Owens's claim that the primary or central wrong in any case where there is a conceptually possible harmless instance of that wrong is a harmless wronging. For example, we usually believe that doctors wrong their patients by acting without their consent because we recognize patients' significant nonnormative interests in having control over their own lives, bodily integrity, and so forth.
For example, a surgeon may perpetrate both a harmless wronging, grounded in the patient's permissive interests, as well as a harmful wronging, grounded in the patient's nonnormative interests.
Owens may respond by suggesting that if we are committed to an interest-based account of wronging, we must postulate normative interests in order to account for harmless wrongs, even if this means accepting some seemingly counterintuitive results.
To see this, note first that IH implicitly depends upon a form of consequentialism about wronging: according to IH, if Y is to wrong X by acting it must be the case that Y's action is an action against some interest of X's.