The better conclusion, however, is that there are enough differences between Molly Hootch and Moore to make such a cursory disposition of the adequacy issue unlikely.
Furthermore, an adequacy standard is consistent with Molly Hootch's holding that differences in the quality and type of education are constitutional.
Although the holding in Molly Hootch should not dispose of the adequacy question, the interpretive framework it established for defining rights under the Education Clause provides a helpful roadmap for determining whether and to what extent the constitution promises every child an adequate education.
Consistent with the approach urged by the plaintiffs, (98) the court in Molly Hootch said that "[c]omparison of the education provision in the Alaska Constitution with those in other states is also instructive...." (99) Examining the Education Clauses from a number of other states, the court concluded that the Alaska Constitution is "[u]nlike most state constitutions" (100) and accordingly distinguished the holdings of a number of other state courts.
However, by asking the court to adopt the interpretation of or the approach used by another state, (102) the plaintiffs have relied more heavily on the interpretations of other courts than the Molly Hootch framework permits.
The Molly Hootch framework thus provides an approach geared toward producing a state-specific solution.
Before applying the Molly Hootch framework to the Education Clause, it is important to note that it is impossible to predict which factors the court will use to find (or not find) an adequacy guarantee in the constitution.
On the other hand, to interpret the State's duty to provide public education, and Alaskan children's right to receive that education, as a standardless right is to effectively render the words "public school" nugatory, something that the Molly Hootch court explicitly rejected.
The touchstone of the Molly Hootch analysis is defining the scope of the educational right in relation to the intent of the Framers, the problems they were addressing, and the remedies they sought.
(138) As Molly Hootch explained, segregation was the primary problem that the Framers addressed in 1955 and 1956 at the Constitutional Convention.
The rest of the Note will therefore be dedicated to exploring what, if any, specific rights are guaranteed by the Education Clause by examining the final Molly Hootch factor--contemporary views of education--in light of the constitutional values discussed above.
According to Molly Hootch, the constitution "must be construed in light of changing social conditions," but nonetheless may not be interpreted to depart "so far from its original terms and meaning as to constitute a radical invasion by the judiciary into an area specifically delegated ...
Molly Hootch, however, draws a clear line between legislative prerogatives and constitutional standards.
at 10 ("Molly Hootch explicitly reserves educational policy decisions and line-drawing exercises for the legislative and executive branches, not the court.").