designate

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designate (someone or something) as (something)

To label or name someone or something as something; to assign someone or something a specific role or status. The boss designated me as the point person for this project, so you guys have to listen to me. No, you can't sit here—mom designated this as the kids' table.
See also: designate

designated driver

A person who stays sober during a social gathering and is responsible for safely driving others from one location to another. Since Kara never drinks alcohol, she always offers to be the designated driver for her friends.
See also: designate, driver
Farlex Dictionary of Idioms. © 2015 Farlex, Inc, all rights reserved.

designate someone or something as something

to choose or name someone or something as something. Alice will designate Andrew as our representative. She designated herself as the head of the committee.
See also: designate
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs. © 2002 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
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References in periodicals archive ?
Why not, in lieu of a sufficient argument to the contrary, expect instead that Leibniz's principle applies to all identities, regardless of how they are formulated, including those expressed by means of rigidly designative proper names or object constants and those expressed by means of nonrigidly designative definite descriptors?
We can, after all, nonrigidly say []xFx = []xGx [right arrow] [for all]H[H[]xFx [right arrow] H[]xGx], with the same presumption of truth, as we can say in a rigidly designative idiom that a = b [right arrow] [for all]F[Fa [right arrow] Fb].
This trivializes either Kripke's K(Q-W) as a proof of the necessity of rigidly designative identities and identity statements, Kripke's unspecified concept of []-necessity, or his category of rigid designation.
To unpack the proposition that rigidly designative identity relations are necessary is to arrive at nothing philosophically more interesting than an empty tautology.
While the "who," therefore, seems comparatively unproblematic, the title simultaneously initiates a process of (pro)nominal slippage: her = Alice = the noble jilt.(21) Pronoun and noun are purely designative; the noun phrase, on the contrary, is descriptive.
In the formal language of Gunther, it has a positive (designative) but not a negative (reflective) value.
Readers not in that category are likely to give up on sentences like the following (describing the 'plural' structure of the 'I' in Company): 'In fact, the referential coincidence of subject and addressee is given as the result of an "abduction" that involves and links at least two designative systems describing the subjects of the communicative model.' This is a pity because Carla LocateIii has much of value to offer the reader not versed in hermeneutics.
159) argues for a broad application of principles from general semantics and not just the "rather simplistic 'extensional' approach." The semantic concern here is with what Morris would call the designative, word-object, or word-referent relationship (Fiordo, 1977, p.
On the other hand, we have its designative function by which the word is said to name some "object." Our written word in every instance must fulfill the first function; it must stand for a speech word--that is why it is written.
In so doing, Taylor rejects the canonical, designative theories of meaning in the analytic tradition and mainstream modern language tradition in favor of "expressive/constitutive" theories pioneered by Rousseau, Herder, and the Romantics (pp.
In addition to explicitly rejecting the notion that a term's meaning or concept is its referent (in passages such as the one quoted earlier from the Ideas), he also develops at least three powerful considerations justifying such a rejection: (1) Already in the Fragments, (91) and especially at the start of On the Origin, he argues that the original and fundamental roots of human language are expressive in nature rather than designative or descriptive, namely the expressive "language of sensation" which human beings share with animals (92)--a position which would be incompatible with equating meanings with referents.
(95) For Wittgenstein too the expressive, as contrasted with the designative or descriptive, function of language--especially in his case, the expressive function of first-person psychological statements--is an important part of the argument against such a theory of meaning.
When built up these signs tend to arouse the interpretants of a whole host of designative, appraisive, and prescriptive linguistic utterances which have occurred in their presence.
Among the designative terms of natural language we find some which, although formulated on the basis of our experience of a diversity of objects, yet express perfections whose intelligible core does not of itself imply the limited conditions under which we experience and from which we abstract (or presciss) that intelligibility and give it expression in the diversity of our conceptions: Nor can it be said that whatever is said of God and of creatures can be predicated completely equivocally, because unless there were some agreement of creature to God according to reality, the divine essence would not be the exemplar of the creatures; and so by knowing his own essence God would not know creatures.
Hence the alternative solution proposed by Kripke and Putnam: that reference is fixed once and for all by an original act of designative naming.