Why not, in lieu of a sufficient argument to the contrary, expect instead that Leibniz's principle applies to all identities, regardless of how they are formulated, including those expressed by means of rigidly designative proper names or object constants and those expressed by means of nonrigidly designative definite descriptors?
We can, after all, nonrigidly say xFx = xGx [right arrow] [for all]H[HxFx [right arrow] HxGx], with the same presumption of truth, as we can say in a rigidly designative idiom that a = b [right arrow] [for all]F[Fa [right arrow] Fb].
This trivializes either Kripke's K(Q-W) as a proof of the necessity of rigidly designative identities and identity statements, Kripke's unspecified concept of -necessity, or his category of rigid designation.
To unpack the proposition that rigidly designative identity relations are necessary is to arrive at nothing philosophically more interesting than an empty tautology.
If we expand K(Q-W) assumption (1) to take nonrigidly designative identity relations also into account, then we might substitute the otherwise redundant but in this context more informatively explicit proposition:
Embodying metaphor, this type of discourse acknowledges the designative
mode but employs words that are primarily appraisive in mode (Fiordo, 1977, p.
The semantic concern here is with what Morris would call the designative
, word-object, or word-referent relationship (Fiordo, 1977, p.
On the other hand, we have its designative
function by which the word is said to name some "object.
In so doing, Taylor rejects the canonical, designative
theories of meaning in the analytic tradition and mainstream modern language tradition in favor of "expressive/constitutive" theories pioneered by Rousseau, Herder, and the Romantics (pp.
In addition to explicitly rejecting the notion that a term's meaning or concept is its referent (in passages such as the one quoted earlier from the Ideas), he also develops at least three powerful considerations justifying such a rejection: (1) Already in the Fragments, (91) and especially at the start of On the Origin, he argues that the original and fundamental roots of human language are expressive in nature rather than designative or descriptive, namely the expressive "language of sensation" which human beings share with animals (92)--a position which would be incompatible with equating meanings with referents.
95) For Wittgenstein too the expressive, as contrasted with the designative or descriptive, function of language--especially in his case, the expressive function of first-person psychological statements--is an important part of the argument against such a theory of meaning.
When built up these signs tend to arouse the interpretants of a whole host of designative
, appraisive, and prescriptive linguistic utterances which have occurred in their presence.
Among the designative
terms of natural language we find some which, although formulated on the basis of our experience of a diversity of objects, yet express perfections whose intelligible core does not of itself imply the limited conditions under which we experience and from which we abstract (or presciss) that intelligibility and give it expression in the diversity of our conceptions:
Hence the alternative solution proposed by Kripke and Putnam: that reference is fixed once and for all by an original act of designative