credence

(redirected from credences)
Also found in: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Legal, Encyclopedia.

lend support to (something)

1. To add information or details to something, especially to make it seem more credible or probable. Do you have any evidence that lends support to your assertion? We cannot do anything that will lend support to our opponents' allegations about us.
2. To provide assistance or approval to something. The president is lending support to the governor's re-election campaign. Your department will have responsibility, but the sales team will lend support to the project if needed.
See also: lend, support

lend credence to (something)

To make something seem more credible or probable, perhaps by providing additional information or details. He splashed mud all over his car and clothes to lend credence to his story about being in the mountains all weekend. We cannot do anything that will lend credence to our opponents' allegations about us.
See also: credence, lend

give credence to (someone or something)

To make something seem more credible or probable, perhaps by providing additional information or details. You're famous in this field—if you comment this guy's wacky notions, you'll just be giving credence to them. Ultimately, we need an expert to give credence to our findings.
See also: credence, give

give credence to someone or something

to consider someone or something as believable or trustworthy. How can you give credence to a person like Henry? I can't give any credence to Donald. He tells lies. Don't give credence to what he says. Please don't give credence to that newspaper article.
See also: credence, give

lend supˈport, ˈweight, ˈcredence, etc. to something

make something seem more likely to be true or genuine: This latest evidence lends support to her theory.
See also: lend, something
References in periodicals archive ?
DESCRIPTIVE REALIZER: Some admissible epistemic standard (that is, some standard that the speaker would, given his normative perspective, correctly deem to be acceptable) would, given contextually specified evidence, permit not assigning a much higher credence to p than not-p, given that one assigns them credences at all.
EPISTEMIC PRESCRIPTIVITY: No acceptable epistemic standard would, for any given body of evidence, both permit assigning a much higher credence to p than not-p and also permit not assigning a much higher credence to p than not-p, given that one assigns them credences at all.
DESCRIPTIVE REALIZER entails that at least one admissible standard permits not assigning a much higher credence to p than not-p, given that one assigns them credences at all.
De Finetti shows how the pattern of credences which the objectivist derives from priors about an unknown bias can be given independent plausibility as the priors of a subjectivist who regards the tosses as exchangeable.
The Principal Principle is a principle of Reason; it tells us that it is reasonable to conform our credences to the chances.
The Principal Principle connects chance and credence, and it is clear that something like it must hold for any sensible account of chance.
In this toy example, it happens that the way we would most naturally apply the Principle of Indifference--to the set of possible outcome sequences--gives the same recommendation for our credences as NP.
Neither PP nor OP should be used to govern our credences at this level; they are rationally determined, if at all, by considerations independent of the "objective chance" of such events.
We chose to scale the credences in such a way that all the point-credences sum to 1.
Credences and expected values respond differently to redistribution of credence with point-values held constant.
Let M be a magnitude taking different values ([M.sub.i]) at the elements of a set of mutually exclusive propositions ([Q.sub.i]) the credences of which sum to 1.
Given a modest consistency requirement on credences (briefly, that one's credences ought to reflect one's beliefs about chance) it follows that credence is one's epistemic estimate of chance (Oddie and Menzies 1992).
Credence ID will be demonstrating the CredenceTWO at the ID4Africa conference (April 24-26) in Abuja Nigeria, Booth C16.
This notion is, ultimately, dispensable: where "inadmissible" information was taken to break the connection between credence and chance, I show that on the contrary there is a perfectly straighforward way to incorporate such information into the connection.
I assume, as an idealization, that reasonable opinion is described by a probability distribution--called a "credence function"--over the space of possible worlds.