conventional

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the received wisdom

Common knowledge that is held to be true, but may not be. The received wisdom says to feed a cold and starve a fever, but that doesn't reflect current medical practice.
See also: received, wisdom

the conventional wisdom

Common knowledge that is held to be true, but may not be. The conventional wisdom says to feed a cold and starve a fever, but that doesn't reflect current medical practice.
See also: conventional, wisdom

conventional wisdom

A widely held belief on which most people act. For example, According to conventional wisdom, an incumbent nearly always wins more votes than a new candidate . This term was invented by John Kenneth Galbraith, who used it in The Affluent Society (1958) to describe economic ideas that are familiar, predictable, and therefore accepted by the general public. Today it is used in any context where public opinion has considerable influence on the course of events.
See also: conventional, wisdom

conventional/received ˈwisdom

the view or belief that most people have: Conventional wisdom has it that riots only ever happen in big cities.The term conventional wisdom was first used by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith in his book The Affluent Society.

conventional wisdom, the

What the majority believe and act upon. The term was coined by the American economist John Kenneth Galbraith in The Affluent Society (1958), in which he so described economic views that are familiar, predictable, and therefore generally accepted. It was soon transferred to other areas in which public opinion plays an important role in influencing events. It has just about replaced the now virtually obsolete cliché, climate of opinion.
See also: conventional
References in periodicals archive ?
There is an important connection between the conventionalist and common law justifications for our constitutional practices.
He is too caught up in polemical skirmishes (between conventionalists and anticonventionalists) that are surely of only passing interest.
Thus Foucault's work is largely conventionalist.(6 )
Conventionalists claim that the criteria used to evaluate theories are merely agreed-upon conventions.
These points demonstrate that workplace privacy protections cannot be purely conventionalist. A social equality perspective cannot precisely answer the question of where to draw the line of privacy protection, but it does suggest three points that may help guide the search for answers.
More ambitiously, originalists might object that it is impossible for a conventionalist text to serve as a focal point because the number of plausible alternative meanings is essentially infinite.
(17.) It is, of course, not only intellectuals on the left who advance the conventionalist view about rights, that rights are granted by government.
On the one hand a tradition that sees them as a 'constellation of fixed stars of thought, as forms (or even contents) independent of any human development and historical experience, and thus immutable'; on the other hand a conventionalist view that assigns to them the task 'of organizing experiences within discourse, creating a network of concepts that make experiences meaningful.
For our purposes, the equation of conventionalist meaning with the
Dasenbrock begins his account in the 1960s, when several strands of Continental and Anglo-American philosophy formed what he calls "the conventionalist paradigm," or the belief that truth, meaning, and value are determined by contingent or arbitrary conventions.
SC describes his own approach as pragmatic and conventionalist; that is, the criteria for evaluating an account comes from the shared practices of the interpretive community of which a scholar is part and is thus intersubjective rather than objective (the meaning is in the text, or facts) or strictly subjective (the meaning is in me).
In particular, he shows how Poincare's philosophies of geometry and physics are both structural realist views, and how this differs from the standard reading of Poincare as conventionalist.
(16) If such a stance is taken to comprise the Hegelian position--pace the misreading of Hegel it involves--then the framework for normative theory generated out of the choice of an epistemological relativism as the point of departure for this purpose remains conventionalist. This means that scope, manner, and justification for moral action in the community remain within the confines of the interpretive means provided by its shared cultural traditions.
In other words, Walzer's theories of just war and distributive justice are methodologically unified by the same interpretative or "conventionalist" approach to moral and political theory
Such conventionalist stratagems may be clearly seen in the debate surrounding Leibenstein's X-efficiency - see Leibenstein (1986) and the following comments in the winter 1986 issue of the Journal of Behavioral Economics.