conceive

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conceive of (someone or something)

To think of someone or something, often in a particular way. Considering her lack of patience, I have a really hard time conceiving of her as a kindergarten teacher. Leave it to Ben to conceive of a totally ridiculous plan.
See also: conceive, of

conceive of (someone or something) as (someone or something)

To think of someone or something in a different way than usual. Considering her lack of patience, I have a really hard time conceiving of her as a kindergarten teacher.
See also: conceive, of

conceive of someone or something

to think of or invent the notion of someone or something. Who on earth ever conceived of doing this? Edison conceived of many very useful things that we now use every day.
See also: conceive, of

conceive of someone or something as someone or something

to think of someone as being someone else; to think of something as being something else. I can't conceive of you as a pilot. I can conceive of this grassy spot as a very interesting setting for a cottage.
See also: conceive, of
References in periodicals archive ?
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem, KATALIN BALOG
This paper explains how the conceivability (Zombie) argument against physicalism fails.
One important feature of its ordinary use--the conceivability of veridical perceptions--is absent.
1) The conceivability of the physical world's running in the opposite temporal direction.
Such is the case with Yablo's attempt to ground modal truth in conceivability, since this leaves him unable to account for discrepancies in the kinds of things that are deemed possible (and here O'Connor incisively points out that whereas Descartes could conceive of himself as existing without a body, Hobbes could not, and that whereas Hume could think of an event without a cause, Leibniz could not).
Matthews, "On Conceivability in Anselm and Malcolm," The Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 110-11.
One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts.
Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, the author will argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not.
Frankish shows that using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism.
It is further argued that the source of the fallacy in the first paralogism is a confusion about the very nature of conceivability and that, in identifying this confusion, Kant makes a philosophical contribution of lasting value.