We hypothesize that perceptions of corruption itself will be a key explanatory variable for actual bribing behavior because, as argued in Cabelkova and Hanousek (2004), the willingness to bribe likely increases with the degree of corruption perceptions.
If education is perceived to perform a signaling mechanism in job search, the expected benefits of bribing are then higher.
On the other hand, if a student feels that educators receiving bribes are "business people" or are "forced to" accept it, then bribing is classified as a noncriminal act.
Thus we include a dummy for student employment status in an attempt to capture an income effect on bribing (Mocan 2008).
Assume that at this bribing competition stage any preceding cost of reporting (C) is sunk and does not reduce E's willingness to pay (our conclusions would be strengthened otherwise).
S] is larger than the cost [pi] law enforcers incur in lying, S will win the bribing game and E thus would not report to start with.
This especially true when it comes to corruption data, given the secrecy attached to bribing
Bribing parties in traffic violation cases generally sought the
of bribing or is implicated by a middleman, this incentive is limited.
Next, it is easily shown that optimal strategies for A will involve bribing all legislators in a set [[z.
1] and 0, then A can prevent B from invading without bribing any legislators.
First, we show that A can prevent B from invading by bribing only legislators in [0, [v.
This implies that A cannot prevent an invasion by B without bribing legislators outside the [0, [v.
If convicted of bribing
a government employee, the accused can face between three and five years in prison followed by deportation.
Seven other officials of four electrical equipment makers were previously arrested on suspicion of bribing