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Related to bribed: briber

bribe (someone) into (doing something)

To use a gift or reward to entice someone into doing something. With the promise of candy, I was able to bribe my little sister into cleaning my room. No amount of money will bribe me into abandoning my morals, sir!
See also: bribe
Farlex Dictionary of Idioms. © 2015 Farlex, Inc, all rights reserved.

bribe someone into doing something

to pay money to get someone to do something. You can't bribe me into doing anything! Max bribed Lily into leaving early.
See also: bribe
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs. © 2002 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
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References in periodicals archive ?
Similarly, we find that a student is less likely to bribe for credit if they bribed on a term paper while more likely to bribe for credit if they bribed on an exam.
Payments above v(0) would make some bribed members of A's coalition more expensive for B to buy than legislator 0.
A always adopts a leveling strategy because A's bribed coalition must contain more than v(0) members.
To prevent B from invading, A must make offers such that each bribed legislator costs [W.sub.B]/m to B.
The legislators in the interval [[v.sup.-1]([W.sub.B]/[m.sup.*]), [v.sup.-1](0)] represent the bribed friends of A, that is, legislators who receive payments from A even though they initially support x.
This follows from the fact that if any bribed member of A's coalition costs more than b, then A could decrease the bribe slightly and keep B's cost of invading the same, while strictly decreasing his own costs.
Next, we show that all members of A's bribed coalition (actually, all members with the possible exception of a set of measure zero) cost at least b dollars for B to buy.
Thus, the revised strategy for A is superior, and it follows that for each member of A's bribed coalition v(z) + [a.sup.*](z) = b.
It is easily shown that A will not make any member of his bribed coalition cost more than b.
No bribed member of coalition can cost more than b.
Now, since a positive-measure set of legislators [subset] [-1/2, 0) are bribed, it follows that more than m legislators have costs of b or less for B to bribe.
Because A adopts a leveling strategy, each bribed legislator costs b for B to buy.
Next note that if legislator 0 is bribed, [a.sup.*](0) + v(0) = [W.sub.B]/m.
Note that A will pay [W.sub.B]/m - v(z) to each member of his bribed coalition which is ([v.sup.-1]([W.sub.B]/m), m].