The Comment proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the history and characteristics of wolf-pack activism.
(23) In cases where a proxy fight merely seeks to replace a company's board of directors, wolf-pack participants tend to sell their shares shortly after the change is accomplished.
Third, the ten-day disclosure window under section 13(d) critically undermines the value of any potential disclosures from wolf-pack members.
In particular, institutional shareholders with long-term investment objectives and corporate management seeking to implement long-term strategic goals may find themselves particularly disadvantaged in the face of increasing wolf-pack activism.
Wolf-pack activists have different agendas and some may exit before a proxy contest.
In an increasingly crowded activist market, there is a real risk of overpunishing wolf-pack activism: stock prices may suffer due to increased market uncertainty over the legality and potential success of activist campaigns, including those that may yield value for shareholders.